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Summary 
From the early 1990s up to 2006, the Turkish Army was reported to have used the 
burning of forests, fields and villages in the Kurdish areas as a strategy in the conflict against 
the insurgent PKK. This article evaluates this claim through the use of satellite images. The 
processed satellite images revealed significant forest burning. Furthermore, the crossing of 
the satellite data with geo-referenced eyewitness accounts showed that forest burnings went 
often accompanied with village destruction. This article concludes that combinations of data 
from witness reports with satellite images can become a powerful tool for human rights 
organizations to monitor forest burning in armed conflict. 
Counter-Insurgency and Destruction of Resources 
Since the early eighties there has been a struggle for control over large areas in East-Turkey, between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers Party. In the early nineties the war between state forces and the PKK began to take many lives, 
displace people and destroy villages on a wide and systematic scale. International human 
rights organizations claimed that from 1991 onwards security forces started a full-scale 
dirty war (Amnesty International 1996:50). 
The Kurdistan Workers Party {Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan or PKK) had emerged 
from an urban and leftwing student environment in Turkey (Ankara mainly), but did 
not remain confined to this social and spatial environment. The party established itself 
in the countryside in the eastern part of Turkish Kurdistan and developed considerable 
support from the lower strata, in particular peasants and agricultural workers. Typical for 
an understanding of the PKK strategy to establish itself also in rural areas is that it did not 
base its politics on the idea that it could take over 'the state' in a great moment of change 
(in analogy to the seizure of the tsar's winter palace by the Bolshevik in 1917), but on the 
idea of developing counter-power and counter-institutions that would replace those of 
the state. This was best to be organized in areas where the state was absent or weak, e.g. 
rural areas (Jongerden 2007). 
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Following the approach developed by Mao, the PKK envisaged a three-stage struggle: 
from strategic defense (armed propaganda, small scale attacks, mobile warfare), to 
strategic balance, and then strategic offence (tmset 1995; Kutschera 1999; özdag 2003). 
The three-stage model involved a move from guerrilla to a more conventional form of 
warfare, with mobile warfare as transitional between the guerrilla strategy (based on the 
creation of a space to move) and the conventional (based on the creation of a space of 
control). In mobile warfare, the PKK argued, the rules of regular warfare start to appear, 
but its guerrilla character remains. Large contingents of guerrillas would advance deep 
behind enemy lines. The guerilla would not fight pitched battles, but attack and withdraw 
swiftly (Özdag 2003). In the final phase of the war, the guerrilla army, supported by a 
popular uprising in the cities, was supposed to force the Turkish army to leave all of 
Kurdistan, but this final battle was only to be started when the enemy was swamped, 
groggy, and demoralized, psychologically prepared for defeat. 
By 1990, the PKK had established hegemony in large parts of the Southeast, in 
particular in Serhat (covering parts of Hakkari, Van and some territories in Iraq and Iran), 
Garzan (covering parts of Batman, Siirt, Van, Hizan and Gevas), Botan (covering parts of 
Sjrnak, Hakkari, Van, Siirt, Eruh and parts of Northern Iraq), and Amed (covering parts 
of Diyarbakir, Bingöl, Genç, and Mus). Although the PKK did not establish permanent 
control it succeeded in preventing the security forces from entering or remaining within 
these areas for long periods of time. These areas were considered to be one step away from 
the establishment of so-called 'red liberated zones' and had the status of 'semi-liberated 
zones' (marking a transition from the phase of Strategic Defense to Strategic Balance). In 
many of the smaller settlements in the mountainous areas the PKK lodged guerrillas day 
and night. At times the PKK became overconfident -sometime during 1992, for example, 
the guerrilla commander 'Dr. Baran' (Müslüm Durgun) recklessly took his troops down 
the mountain and into the district town Ovacik in daytime. In this period the PKK also 
considered and actually tried to seize towns such as Çirnak and Nusaybin, an attempt that 
failed (özdag 2007). 
In spite of numerical superiority—in 1993, a state force of 185,000 (excluding the 
gendarmerie and village guards) pit against some 15,000-20,000 guerrillas—the 
performance of the army was bad. Operations were carried out, but units returned to 
their barracks before dawn. The Turkish military preferred to take up defensive and static 
positions, especially at night, when soldiers were thought to be safe in their enclosures, 
which they were not. Many of the garrisons had been built at the slopes of hills or other 
locations were they could be easily besieged. Moreover, the quality of the construction 
materials was low, and any shoot out turned the enclosures into a strainer (Kundakçi 
2007). Also, the Turkish armed forces had decided to concentrate on the defense of larger 
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settlements and to refrain from nocturnal operations, which gave the PKK considerable 
freedom to establish control in the smaller settlements and to move by night. Every now 
and then, the army would organize large sweeps, sending tens of thousands troops into 
an area, but these actions were not very effective as the guerrilla escaped into hiding 
while troops were being concentrated and during the operation, only to return after their 
retreat and dispersal. In warfare theory, the conclusion of counter-insurgency specialists 
is that sweeps don't work (Tomes 2004). 
American military sources and Turkish specialists ascribed the bad performance 
of the Turkish army during the 1986-1993 period to the lack of an integrated strategic 
counter-insurgency doctrine (Özdag 2003, 2007). Until the dissolution of the Warsaw 
Pact in 1990, the main mission of the army had been that of a static defense, aimed at 
countering Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in the Caucasus and any possible attack on 
Thrace. The PKK posed a very different threat. Over time, and at some cost, the army 
learned that a counter-insurgency war could not be fought from a defensive and static 
position. There were serious deficiencies in the army's ability to respond with speed and 
flexibility, deficiencies that became even clearer with the spread of guerrilla warfare over 
the entire region of southeastern Turkey. 
The Turkish armed forces thus formulated an integrated doctrine of area control, named 
the 'field domination doctrine', and aimed at the production of a new (contracted rural 
and urban) war space. The doctrine had been laid down in 1991, but not put into practice 
until after the reorganization of the army, initiated in 1992, was completed in 1993. A 
change was announced from 'search and destroy' sweeps to a 'clear and hold' penetration 
strategy (Özdag 2003). The 'field domination doctrine' implied, among other things, that 
the armed forces would abandon the approach of garrison-line-of-defense. 'Garrisons,' 
wrote General Osman Pamukoglu, commander of the Hakkari Mountain Warfare and 
Commando Brigade between 1993 and 1995, 'do not provide protection, but because of 
their static disposition are targets for the enemy' (Pamukoglu 2003) Commando brigades 
and Special Forces became key elements in the war against the PKK. Their soldiers were 
supposed to stay in the field day and night, searching for PKK units and camps. It is ironic 
that by 1993 the army had started to apply guerrilla tactics against the PKK at a time that 
the PKK was preparing for conventional warfare. 
The war became not only one of movement—numerical superiority was also considered 
a key element in the establishment of area control. Between 1993 and 1995, the number of 
Turkish troops in the region was increased from 185,000 to 360,000 (including as many 
as 70,000 village guards). The majority of forces continued to perform regular duties. In 
Hakkari, for example, the land forces comprised fourteen battalions amounting to 56,000 
soldiers in 1995, but only five battalions were employed in a war of movement. These five 
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battalions were organized into special units of 'go-getters' who lived in the mountains 
for weeks, hunting the guerrilla. The nine other battalions had regular tasks to fulfill, 
generally involved in patrolling an assigned area. When PKK guerrillas were spotted, 
their mission was not to engage in contact, but to surround them. Special units were 
transported to the area by helicopter and took up the pursuit (Özdag 2003; Pamukoglu 
2003; Jongerden 2007). 
Following the new doctrine, the General Staff decided to reorganize the army and 
shifted from a relatively cumbrous divisional and regimental structure (designed in the 
period of the Cold War) to a relatively flexible corps and brigades structure (to fight 
a multi-directional and multi-dimensional internal enemy), which was supposed to 
contribute to a more rapid response and higher mobility (Ministry of Defense 2000). 
Prior to the army reorganization, the principal tactical units had consisted of sixteen 
infantry divisions and one armored division, plus twenty-three independent brigades, 
of which six were armored and four mechanized. Basically, the Turkish land force was a 
large but badly equipped infantry force. Under the reorganization, all except three of the 
seventeen infantry divisions were dismantled. The existing nine corps were retained, with 
brigades directly responsible to the corps commands. 
Parallel to the sweeping 1992 reorganization of the army, several other significant 
changes and additions were made to the structure of the Turkish land forces. Most 
importantly, there was a major strategic shift, with the army instead of the poorly trained 
gendarme being handed the lead role in the fight against the PKK. Also an upgrading 
of personnel infrastructure and hardware took place. Another change involved the 
development of special units. Last but not least, poor performance of state forces was also 
identified as low levels of information about the enemy, so the Turkish armed forces tried 
to improve their intelligence. In relation to that, the authorities also started to take an 
interest in social research, turning the people and the region in objects of study in order 
to know them better (for an extensive discussion see Jongerden 2007). 
We would like to emphasize that the immediate aim of the new doctrine and 
strategy was the destruction of the PKKs environment. A constituent element of 
environment destruction was village evacuation and destruction and the burning of 
forests. Village evacuation and destruction and forest burning in Eastern Turkey received 
public attention. Civil society organizations and international and local human rights 
organizations claimed on basis of witness accounts that the Turkish Army systematically 
burned and evacuated villages, and destroyed rural livelihoods by burning fields and 
forests (HRW 1995; SNK 1995; IHD 1996). Yet the scope and impact of human rights 
violations were difficult to assess because these areas were sealed off by the army, not 
only for civil society organizations willing to obtain witness accounts, but even for high-
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ranking politicians. Evacuated inhabitants of the region were dispersed geographically, 
hindering comprehensive assessments (noted by SNK 1995). 
This paper further examines the scope and impact of the military destruction of 
the environment in Turkey. It focuses on one area within Eastern Turkey for which 
information was available: the province of Tunceli. It uses an innovative methodology 
to establish geographical patterns of environment destruction comparing eyewitness 
accounts and remote sensing data using spatial analysis. 
Tunceli Province 
The province of Tunceli is situated in the 
Eastern Anatolian region of Turkey and covers 
approximately 760,000 hectares (See Map 1). The 
area is part of the Munzur catchments, one of 
the main tributaries of the Euphrates River. The 
Munzur Mountains are rugged, with deep valleys 
and high peeks that range in altitude from 950 to 
3,463 meters. The area has a continental climate ' • ••?..•,.?** 
with extreme temperature differences in winter Map 1. Tunceli Province, Turkey 
and summer, and precipitation varies per district 
between 550 and 1100 mm/year. Forests cover 27 percent (207.666 ha) of Tunceli, while 
61 percent of this forest has a protected status.' Deciduous forests are found mostly in 
Tunceli, Ovacik, Pülümür, Hozat and Nazimiye. Pine trees are found especially in the 
North, above 1800 meters. 
In 1990, the total population of Tunceli was 133,585, of whom 50,799 lived in urban 
areas, while the rural population amounted to 82,785. The main agricultural activities in 
the area are animal husbandry and farming. The province is subdivided in eight districts, a 
central district dependent on the provincial town (Tunceli), and seven districts dependent 
district towns (Çemiskezek, Hozat, Mazgirt, Nazimiye, Ovacik, Pertek, Pülümür). There 
are 416 villages2 and 804 hamlets3 in the province of Tunceli. The province has the smallest 
population of the eastern provinces of Anatolia. 
According to witness accounts, the military started a wave of operations in 1994, with 
forest fires, between July and August, and village evacuations in the autumn of 1994. By 
2000, the total population had reduced with 35%. Especially the countryside depopulated 
heavily, with 75%, while the urban population increased slightly with 7%. In southeast 
Turkey as a whole most of the evacuation and destruction of villages was said to have taken 
place between 1990 and 1995, while 1994 reportedly is the year with most evacuations 
(See Table 1 on next page). This is also the case in Tunceli, where a significant proportion 
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of the evacuations took place. Table 2 gives a detailed breakdown of reported village and 
forest destruction for this province (See Table 2). A local politician with close ties to the 
region claimed that 25% of the forests were destructed in this period (SNK 1995). 
SU OOHEM^fei CmO^lltt l ' i CKÜlälllllNl dKJÀ^illiiPl QQH.* '^^S%CIQI^ , ^ÄÄ^I QÔ!5Nl§illl# aûll!^l§§lll't QCill'i^^ft'SSftfWf*flllË^!3(Aft"#ll 
109 295 874 1,531 243 68 23 30 30 0 3 
Table 1. Number of evacuated and burned villages 1991-2001, calculated on the basis of human 
rights reports Source: Jongerden (2007:82) 
Access to Geo-Data 
At the time of study (2000) it was still difficult to obtain topographical maps from the 
area. However, researchers from our research project were able to get access to a detailed 
Russian 1:100.000 topographical map, scale 1:100.000 (1970-1994).4 
It was easy to find older remote sensing data for the area, such as two images we 
acquired from 1990 and 1994. For our study we selected Landsat Thematic Mapper 
images, because of their relatively low costs and because they are appropriate for our 
object of study (forests and burned areas).5 With a resolution (minimum pixel size) of 
30 meters, Thematic Mapper images have been used widely for assessing land use and 
land use changes. With high-resolution satellites it would have been feasible to perceive 
destruction of villages and houses. These images were not yet available for the period we 
considered. 
Two Landsat-5 Thematic Mapper images were selected to be able to compare pre- and 
post-conflict forest coverage. The first image was taken in August 1990 and represents the 
situation just before the change of strategy by the army (1991). (See Map 2) The second 
image was taken in October 1994, representing the situation just after reported forest 
fires in the summer of 1994 (SNK 1995). (See Map 3) It was easy to detect dense forest 
land-use in both images. For the interpretation the northern part of the image was used, 
covering around 95% of the Tunceli province. 
Interpretation of images requires assigning pixels of the image to land use classes 
(among them burned forest) on the basis of their specific spectral profile. Normally geo-
referenced field observations are used to link spectral profiles to specific land uses. Since 
it was not feasible to make field visits at the time of study, alternative sources of data 
were used to establish land use classes for certain areas. These known areas were used 
to establish spectral profiles and classify the remainder of the image, using supervised 
classification. (See Table 3 on Page 10) 
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lIPP 
Tunceli 
Hozat 
Mazgirt 
Ovacik 
Pülümür 
Total 
^^^^Sl^^B^Ä^^^^H 
Central 
Çicekli 
Kocakoç 
Sütlücü 
ÇemLgezek 
Akçapinar 
Gedikler 
Central 
Çajarca 
Central 
Akpazar 
Darikent 
Nazimiye 
Büyükyurt 
Dallibahçe 
Central 
Karaojan 
Yejlyazi 
Pertek 
Akdemir 
Dere 
Pinarlar 
Central 
Balpayam 
Da_yolu 
Kirmiziköprü 
Ûçdam 
15 
11 
11 
11 
16 
9 
14 
29 
7 
26 
21 
31 
12 
12 
6 
45 
6 
14 
9 
8 
10 
17 
10 
7 
12 
25 
5 
399 
7 
1 
3 
8 
2 
1 
0 
15 
4 
3 
0 
6 
8 
2 
4 
26 
3 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
10 
1 
110 
3 
0 
3 
4 
1 
1 
0 
10 
1 
0 
0 
2 
3 
2 
3 
18 
5 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
4 
0 
64 
8 
1 
4 
9 
3 
2 
0 
18 
4 
3 
0 
7 
4 
2 
4 
37 
6 
7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
5 
11 
1 
137 
53 
9 
36 
82 
19 
22 
0 
62 
57 
12 
0 
23 
33 
17 
67 
82 
100 
50 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
14 
42 
44 
20 
34 
Table 2. Numbers of villages evacuated and burned during the autumn 1994 army 
operations in Tunceli province Source: Stichting Nederland- Koerdistan 
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Map 2. Landsat-5 Thematic Mapper image taken August 1990. It represents the situation 
just before the change of strategy the army in 1991. 
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Map 3. Landsat-5 Thematic Mapper image taken October 1994. It represents the 
situation just after reported forest fires in the summer of 1994. 
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The burned areas as identified on the satellite images were compared with incidences 
described in a report prepared by the Dutch NGO 'Stichting Nederland- Kurdistan' (SNK, 
Netherlands-Kurdistan Foundation, 1995). This inventory details the wave of village 
evacuations, demolitions and forest fires that swept Tunceli during the autumn of 1994, 
distinguishing villages with 1) recorded forest fires, 2) village destruction or 3) villages 
with human rights abuse reports, but without destruction or fires. 
To be able to compare data from the SNK report with remote sensing data, the report 
was geo-referenced using the names of villages in which reported events occurred 
using the Russian topographical map. Other villages, not mentioned in the report, 
but clearly visible on the topographical map and satellite image were also included in 
the examination. Of the 143 villages, 53 were mentioned in the SNK report having 
evacuations, without mention of forest fire or destruction, in 40 cases fire was reported, 
in 20, village destruction was reported. No information was present at all in the report 
regarding 30 villages on the map. 
Class Descriptie maim 
Forest 
Debris flow 
Water 
Rock or bare soil* 
Urban area or bare so i l " 
Field type a (fallows?) 
Field type b (fallows?) 
Field type c (grassland?) 
River sides 
Sparse vegetation 
Clouds 
Shadows 
'Heavily' burned (probably forest) 
'Slightly' burned (probably non-forest) 
•Visible as blue on a false colour 
RGB-743 image 
"Visible as pink on a false colour 
RGB-743 image 
67,096 
33,921 
204,327 
115,925 
437,547 
7,221 
2,083 
8,034 
7,590 
29,394 
-
-
-
-
9,616 
33,921 
204,327 
54,136 
61,141 
5,821 
5,151 
20,657 
7,994 
30,879 
22,896 
9,444 
2,739 
2,153 
Table 3. Training area classes and their size (number of pixels) 
Source (Van Hoeve & A. Klaasse 2001) 
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Results and Discussion 
The study indicates a considerable destruction of land and forests in the area in 1994. 
More than 60,000 hectares (600 km2) were classified as burned, of which 11,000 hectares 
(110 km2) was classified as dense forest. This implies that 7.5% of all forests in the area 
was burned in 1994. Two important methodological remarks should be made, putting 
these results in perspective. First, our calculation of burned forest is conservative since 
only 10.3 percent of the area under study was classified as dense forest. This classification 
estimate is low in comparison to the forested area given by official census data, which 
includes 27% in this class. Yet in our classification only continuous, relatively dense forest 
was included in this forest class. Second, occurrence of fires in areas which were classified 
as 'non-forest areas' in this study could be ascribed to forests wrongly not classified as 
such, but also to destruction of harvests and orchards. Witness accounts of destruction 
of harvests are present and a decrease in orchards in Tunceli in this period has been 
documented above (Table 4). The area and percentage actually burned is likely to be 
higher than calculated in this research. 
In spite of these qualifications, the estimate that 25% of the forests were burned made 
by a local politician should be considered as on the high side compared to the 7.5 % in our 
study. Interesting though, 26.6 % of the forests that were located within the 1.2 km radius 
around villages were burned. Thus for those forests most relevant to local livelihoods, this 
estimate is indeed remarkably realistic. 
The research showed that in most but not all cases reported fires by witness accounts 
were confirmed by the satellite image in which we used a radius of 1.2 km around the 
village of a minimum of 4.5 hectares of burned surface as a threshold for this study 
(60 %; See Table 5). Witness accounts signaled that burning took place in mountain areas 
and along the Munzur River. The burned areas displayed on Map 3 show that considerable 
burning took place along all main streams of the province. The location of the interpreted 
Wheat 
Barley 
Lentils 
Chickpeas 
Beans 
Total 
35,282 
11,837 
21,300 
4,485 
610 
73,514 
28,000 
9,000 
15,000 
2,710 
520 
55,230 
%ptoduc*ion(%l8 
21 
24 
30 
40 
15 
25 
Table 4. Reduction in area grown with annual crops (ha), 1990-1995 
Source: Tunceli Sendikalar Platformu (1996) 
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forest-fires confirms witness reports that especially Ovacik, Hozat and the northern parts 
of Tunceli were affected, even though these were not the only areas. 
On the other hand, 40% of the reported forest fires could not be confirmed with the 
method used to determine presence or absence per village. These unconfirmed eyewitness 
reports might refer to forests outside a 1.2 km radius around the village or to forest fires 
affecting less than 4.5 ha. Also, the location of fires may be inaccurate when they are based 
on smoke observed from a distance. Villages in which no destruction occurred according 
to eyewitnesses or those for which no information was available showed relatively less 
burned forest areas. 
snaai* '• way 
».«••«•MlHÈI 
mi^Mx^m 
Forest in both 1990 and 1994 
Forest in 1990, heavily 
burned in 1994 
Other landuse in 1990, 
slightly or heavily burned in 
1994 
Clouds and shadows in 1994 
Other 
141 
11 
52 
77 
1087 
10.3 
0.8 
3.8 
5.6 
79.4 
Table 5. Land cover classification results 
The high frequency of fires in case of village destruction (85%) draws the attention, 
because this suggests that village destruction almost always went hand in hand with 
burning of forests, orchards and fields around it, even if these fires were not reported. 
Burnings were present even in cases no specific mention was made of forest fire around 
these villages by the eyewitnesses. This may indicate that destruction was not observed 
by villagers because it occurred after the evacuation was completed, thus revealing the 
limitations of the data based on eyewitness accounts and the complementary value of 
remote sensing data. Also, that village evacuation proved to be a better predictor of 
remotely sensed burned areas than direct witness accounts of burnings indicates that 
the quality of the village evacuation data may be higher than the fire reports. Possible 
causes of the incompleteness and imprecision of fire reports have been mentioned above. 
Village evacuations, in contrast with fires, are easier to characterize spatially (it concerns 
the village centre, a well geo-referenced point) and involves the entire population of the 
village, creating a considerable pool of informants for each village. 
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It may be concluded that even though details in the accounts taken from witnesses 
were not precise or complete, these limitations could be explained from the ways these 
data were generated. The overall geographical pattern of resource destruction implied 
in the eyewitness accounts is confirmed by the satellite image derived data, which gave 
valuable additional information about the scope and pattern of the use of fire by Turkish 
military during the studied period. 
Conclusions 
On the basis of the processed satellite images it was calculated that in 1994 7.5% 
of the forest in the Tunceli and 26.6% of the forest near villages was burned. This 
constitutes massive resource destruction on behalf of the Turkish Armed Forces. The 
more severe burning around destroyed and evacuated villages is important evidence for 
the intentionality behind the use of fire against civilian populations and underscores the 
claim of human rights abuse. 
We have shown that even with limited resources it is possible to combine remote 
sensing with local data if the exact dimensions of time and place are known for the latter. 
Without recurring to prohibitively expensive and often inaccessible high- resolution 
images we were able to analyze the spatial pattern of resource destruction through a 
triangulation of various types of more readily available information. Our method of 
combining NGO reports with satellite images was only possible because of the availability 
of spatially explicit information on the occurrence of destruction and burning in the 
form of witness accounts. In the future it will be important to anticipate this possibility in 
the information collection protocols used by human rights organizations.6 
It is clear that there are good opportunities to turn the combination of data from 
witness reports with satellite images into a powerful tool for human rights organizations 
to monitor forest burning (and village destruction) in armed conflict. The two main 
advantages of satellite images over eyewitness accounts are that (1) they deliver objective 
data over larger areas and (2) view ground realities without the need of being physically 
present in conflict situations. In the presented case, the remote sensing methodology 
did not allow for the observation of the direct causes for perceived events and land use 
changes. However, it has become clear that even when satellite images are not sufficiently 
detailed and frequent to reveal the direct causes of fires, in combination with witness 
reports satellite images can strengthen the overall case and add to the insight in the scope 
and pattern of violence and destruction. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Official figures from the provincial administration 
(http://www.tunceli.gov.tr/ilhak.htm) 
2. A village has between 250 and 2,000 inhabitants. 
3. A hamlet has more than 50 and less than 250 inhabitants. 
4. Joint Stock Company SK-IMPEX Moscow, Russia Glavnoe Upralenie Geodezii i 
Kartografii pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, 1:100,000.1970-1994. 
5. Due to limited budget a selection was made from a special discount database. At the 
time of the research, the total costs amounted to around 2000 Euros. The cost aspect 
may be interesting to human rights organizations considering using satellite imagery to 
corroborate eyewitness accounts (see also de Vos, Jongerden & van Etten; forthcoming). 
6. Eyewitness accounts should contain references to location and time that are as 
precise and unambiguous as possible. Also, protocols should furnish information about 
the observed and unobserved domains (regarding time, place, type of violation), to 
distinguish (a) areas with no recorded violations but with violations from (b) areas with 
no recorded observations but with possible violations. 
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